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DR. KRE IMIR PIRLt
I. INTRODUCTION
In making a case for an affirmative answer to the main
theme of today's symposium, one might very well start with yet
another question: Is there any alternative way to re-establish
confidence in the international legal order and reaffirm the ba-
sic principles upon which such order is based? The ineffective-
ness of the international community to end the aggression on
the territories of the sovereign, internationally recognized
states of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina puts in doubt the ef-
fectiveness of the United Nations' Charter. As well, it reiter-
ates the conclusion derived from the outcomes of previous world
crisis: perpetrators remain unpunished. To understand the
reasons for the ineffective and meager response of the interna-
tional community to dictators and regimes that violate interna-
tional law, one should contrast legal principles and political
compromises.
A. Legal Arguments Versus a Need for Political Compromise
The major concern involving the establishment of a war
crimes tribunal is the fact that political considerations and end-
ing of hostilities by peaceful settlement may be put in front of
the international community's focus. History provides ample
evidence of successful cessation of hostilities that made prosecu-
tion of persons responsible for war crimes an issue of secondary
political importance.1 As an editorial on genocide in Cambodia
t Counselor, Embassy of the Republic of Croatia to the United States of
America, Washington, D.C. LL.B., University of Rijeka School of Law, 1983;
LL.M., University of Zagreb School of Law, 1988; LL.M., Duke University School of
Law, 1991; S.J.D., Duke University School of Law, 1993. Written text of speech
delivered on October 23, 1993 at Pace University School of Law, White Plains,
N.Y., during Symposium a discussing the need for an international tribunal for
crimes against humanity.
1 There are numerous examples of more recent military conflicts that ended
by cease-fire agreements, making impossible the imposition of personal jurisdic-
tion over suspected war criminals. See Whitney R. Harris, A Call for an Interna-
tional War Crimes Court: Learning From Nuremberg, 23 U. ToL. L. REv. 229,250
(1992).
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noted, "even when genocide is at issue, the demands of peace
sometimes outweigh those of justice."2
Numerous international bodies have called for the estab-
lishment of such a tribunal.3 The Rapporteurs under the CSCE
Moscow Human Dimension Mechanism to Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Croatia, have also assumed that there is, "a determination
common to a number of concerned States to take action with a
view to attributing personal accountability for war crimes and
crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia."4
Professor Theodor Meron stated, "The credibility of interna-
tional humanitarian law demands a war crimes tribunal to hold
accountable those responsible for growth violations in the for-
mer Yugoslavia."5 The Security Council of the United Nations
has also determined that violations of international humanita-
rian law constitute a threat to international peace and security
and has emphasized the importance of the establishment of a
tribunal.6
Unfortunately, the arguments favoring the establishment
of a tribunal must face the reality of the political considerations
and the need, whether grounded or not, for compromise. At-
tempts at resolving the conflict by solely political means have
thus far been fruitless. The international community's han-
dling of aggression on the sovereign states of Croatia and Bos-
nia-Herzegovina has been unsuccessful, lacking determination
and preferring partial political interests of nation-states over
the principles of international law and order. Indeed, this
2 Reprinted in 105 L. DAmLy J., Nov. 3, 1992, at 6, col. 1.
3 E.g., Commission of Experts (War Crimes Commission) established by the
Security Council, S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg., U.N. Doc. S1
RES/780 (1992); United Nations Commission on Human Rights; Helsinki Watch,
Amnesty International, International Law Commission, etc.
4 Proposal for an International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-
via, CSCE Moscow Human Dimension Mechanism to Bosnia.Herzegovina and Cro-
atia. 9 Feb. 1993, at 42 [hereinafter Proposal].
5 Theodor Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, 72 FoREIGN
AFF. (Summer 1993) 122, 122.
6 S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
808 (1993); reaffirmed in S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). See also, 32 I.L.M. 1203 (1993). For the report on the
establishment of the international tribunal, besides official United Nations docu-
ments, see Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki Com-
mission), Prosecuting War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia; An Update, 19 Oct.
1993.
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statement does not need much elaboration. Individuals who are
the main organizers of Serbian aggression, deemed potential
war criminals by the United States, Amnesty International,
Helsinki Watch, and others, are also sitting at the negotiation
table, fully protected by immunity in that capacity. Because
cessation of hostilities is the primary aim, they are sometimes
looked at as peacemakers.
Does the mere fact that the Security Council went on to es-
tablish the tribunal show that alternatives, i.e., political settle-
ments, negotiations, political pressures, did not work? In that
vein, documents establishing the tribunal and its statute, as
well as the existence of the tribunal itself, will not be enough
unless there is a willingness by the international community to
take further effective steps towards its implementation. Such
steps as the arrangements of the extradition of the accused, ex-
erting pressure on states unwilling to cooperate and extradite
them, second the enforcement of judgments, etc.
B. Past Experiences
The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals do not represent ideal
models for a present tribunal because of their historical sur-
roundings, temporary character, and the fact that those Tribu-
nals were an expression of victors' justice.7 Victors' justice is
lacking today mainly due to the abovementioned negotiations
with the perpetrators. However, there is a lesson to be learned
from Nuremberg and Tokyo. Although the political environ-
ment today differs from that after World War II, there remains
a legacy of Nuremberg and a principle of deterrence. There is
also a rule established in Nuremberg that prohibits the initiat-
ing and waging of aggressive war, which was the rule airmed
by the United Nations' General Assembly in 1946.8 If there is
no "new Nuremberg," dictators all over the world can rely on
the world's inactivity and ignorance. The past experiences
serve to warn those in the future. Turkish genocide against
7 See Elizabeth L. Pearl, Punishing Balkan War Criminals: Could the End of
Yugoslavia Provide an End to Victor's Justice, 30 Abi. CmM. L. REv. 1373 (1993).
8 See Harris, supra note 1, at 248. The U.N. resolution "declared that any
person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is
personally responsible and liable to punishment, and that the planning and wag-
ing of aggression constitutes such a crime." Id.
19941
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600,000 Armenians was not punished because of the political
calculations of the Allies who had granted the Turks amnesty.
In 1939, Hitler used this example to ask, "who after all is today
speaking about the destruction of the Armenians?" How many
dictators would be using the same or similar examples, if a mod-
ern tribunal proves to be as ineffective as the earlier attempts
by the international community in this area?
II. WHAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRIBUNAL SHOULD
ACCOMPLISH?
There are strong reasons to continue efforts in the direction
of the tribunal's effectiveness. One of the main goals is to pun-
ish individuals on all sides who are responsible for war crimes
and crimes against humanity. A personal, individual, criminal
responsibility is a necessity. 9 If those individuals are left free,
what will stop them from committing other crimes in the fu-
ture? Therefore, their punishment will have an effect of deter-
ring future war crimes by setting a precedent for ongoing or
future conflicts. It will also strengthen international law and
order. Victims of war crimes are the main group affected. By
punishing perpetrators, victims will be given satisfaction ofjus-
tice, but will also be discouraged from committing revenge
crimes.
There is a specific aim the tribunal should accomplish. In
the area where war crimes and crimes against humanity took
place, the tribunals effective performance will encourage demo-
cratic transformations by discrediting irresponsible political
leaders who prepared and organized the aggression and those
that carried it out.10 In Croatia, punishment of war criminals
will diminish fears among survivors and help encourage dis-
placed persons and refugees to return to their homes in peace
and dignity. It requires mentioning that 13,000 Croats are still
9 See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph Two of Security
Council Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704, at Art. 6, point
53 (1993). 32 I.L.M. 1163, 1174 (1993) (hereinafter Report].
10 "The establishment of the Court would not be only of the legal and humani-
tarian importance, but also of the utmost political importance, because it would
significantly contribute to stop and resolve the conflicts in the entire region of for-
mer Yugoslavia." Statement by the Representative of the Republic of Croatia in
the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on Nov. 6, 1992,
reprinted in Proposal, supra note 4, at 97.
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missing. Two hundred sixty wounded soldiers, civilians, women
and children were taken from Vukovar hospital alone. Their
destiny is still unknown. At the end of July, Croatia cared for
277,000 refugees, making up to 6% of the population on the ter-
ritory that is under Croatian control. In addition to that, there
were close to 250,000 Muslim refugees from the neighboring
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Only the prosecution of the people who
caused the exodus will bring this tragedy to a just end.
Furthermore, during the aggression on the territory of the
Republic of Croatia, of the 2,387 persons killed, 304 were civil-
ians, 40 of whom were children. Among the 6,028 wounded,
1,402 were civilians, 156 of whom were children. Between Jan-
uary 10 and October 11, 1993, 274 were killed, including 68 ci-
vilians and 9 children; 2,285 wounded, including 416 civilians
and 47 children. These statistics show that the failure to stop
the Serbian government's aggression led to more victims. Un-
readiness or unwillingness to stop the Serbian genocidal policy
against its neighbors by using force also ignited war crimes by
the other sides. Therefore, any further delay, already signifi-
cant, will lead to more victims as a result of new war crimes and
crimes against humanity.
III. TnE CROATIAN POSITION
Croatia advocated the establishment of an international
war crimes tribunal from the very early stages of the war in
former Yugoslavia. On November 22, 1991, the Croatian Gov-
ernment discussed this issue and enacted a proposal for estab-
lishment of an international war crimes tribunal, thereby
welcoming the creation of the United Nations' Commission of
Experts. The Croatian Permanent Representative to the
United Nations sent a letter to the Secretary-General on March
11, 1993, emphasizing that Croatia "fully endorses Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993) and the establishment of an in-
ternational tribunal.""' In a statement before the Sixth Com-
mittee of the U.N. General Assembly on November 6, 1993, the
Croatian representative stated:
We would like to emphasize that the Republic of Croatia has al-
ready proposed and initiated the international trials for the war
11 U.N. Doc. S/25412 (Mar. 13, 1993).
1994]
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crimes, crimes against humanity and international law, and the
crimes of genocide, committed on the territory of former Yugosla-
via, in order to punish all perpetrators and organizers irrespective
of their nationality, religion, whereabouts. Republic of Croatia is
fully prepared and has already offered their cooperation with the
experts in this field.12
This position was reiterated on numerous occasions by Croatian
officials, most recently, by the Croatian Foreign Minister, Dr.
Mate Granic in New York, on July 28, 1993.
One further point is very significant. In order to explain
the ineffectiveness of the international community, there has
been an attempt to "balance guilt on all sides." Croatia admits
that war crimes have also been committed by the Muslims and
Croats, and although sometimes indisputably brutal, these can-
not be compared with the magnitude, scale and frequency of
war crimes perpetrated by the Serbs. The international com-
munity failed to respond adequately to a clear case of interna-
tional aggression and genocide. Instead, it left the issue to the
goodwill of the so-called "sides in conflict" to agree on political
and military matters. In Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ser-
bian crimes were orchestrated on a mass scale, with clear evi-
dence of cooperation and coordination between Serbian (JNA)
regular army troops, paramilitary, and irregular forces. Crimes
against civilians, committed on such a large scale, can only be
the result of decisions made at high levels of the Serbian Gov-
ernment. To support this well-known fact, we can cite Judge ad
hoc Lauterpacht's separate opinion in the case Bosnia and Her-
zegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) regarding the
application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, "The Respondent [Yugoslavia -
Serbia/Montenegro] stands behind the Bosnian Serbs and it
must, therefore, be seen as an accomplice to, if not an actual
participant in, this genocidal behavior.' 3
The UN's proposed statute which would establish a war
crimes tribunal does not provide for trials in absentia, which
2 Proposal, supra note 4, at 97.
13 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montene-
gro)), 1993 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 8) (reprinted in 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 505 (1993), Separate
opinion by Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht, Point 69) [hereinafter Lauterpacht].
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should be the case. 14 Such proceedings are not new, as Nurem-
berg set a precedent for in absentia trials of war criminals in
the case of Martin Bormann.15 If there is enough evidence col-
lected, the mere fact that the accused is not accessible to the
tribunal cannot impede his prosecution. If there is a possibility
of trying individuals in absentia, as already emphasized, main
war criminals will not escape international condemnation and
punishment. If there is such a possibility, it will provide the
way to isolate perpetrators as well as the governments giving
shelter and refusing to extradite war criminals. The interna-
tional community has means available for exerting pressure: a
threat of economic sanction, isolation, blockade, or reintegration
into the international community only for nations that show re-
spect for international law and decisions by international
institutions.
Croatia intends to fully cooperate with the international
community and the tribunal. Croatia's legal and other authori-
ties should be fully responsible for the fact-gathering, appre-
hension and extradition of its own citizens. Indeed, one of its
first steps was to establish a Commission for War Crimes. 16
The Croatian Government appointed members, and entrusted
them with the task of collecting and analyzing data on war
crimes committed during the war in Croatia, as well as cooper-
ating with the International War Crimes Tribunal and other in-
ternational organizations. In that respect, Croatian citizens
held responsible for crimes under the jurisdiction of the Inter-
national War Crimes tribunal will be extradited. In fact, Croa-
tia has been very active in collecting data, making reports on
violations of international humanitarian law, and delivering its
findings to the proper international authorities. It established
a system according to the methodology used by the United Na-
tions Commission of Experts. Particular attention was centered
on identifying and prosecuting all violations of human rights
committed on the territory of former Yugoslavia, and prevent-
ing further violations of human rights and humanitarian law.
14 See supra note 6.
15 Harris, supra note 1, at 231 n.6, 245; see also B. SmrrH, REACHING JUDG-
bmNT AT NuREMBERG 229-32 (1977).
16 The decision on establishing the Commission on War Crimes was published
in PEoPLxEs GAzurrE, No. 34/93.
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7
PACE INT'L L. REV.
IV. PossIBLE IMPEDnmNTS To SUCCESSFUL OPERATION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL
Besides the known financial difficulties which burden
United Nations' activities, a problem rests with the above-men-
tioned correlation between legal and political goals. The inter-
national tribunal, created by the Security Council which will
endorse future peace settlements that might include amnesty
provisions (especially for the corresponding politicians) can be
limited to prosecuting minor crimes. This conclusion is derived
from the Secretary-General's Report, which stated that "[als an
enforcement measure under Chapter VII, however, the lifespan
of the international tribunal would be linked to the restoration
and maintenance of international peace and security in the ter-
ritory of the former Yugoslavia, and the Security Counsel deci-
sions related thereto."17
In contrast, the tribunal's task should not only be deter-
rence, but just punishment. If aggression remains unpunished,
it will affect not only the present international legal order, but
any future attempts to create a new tribunal. The problems the
tribunal would have to face are not insurmountable. The world
should seek to have a good court, not strive for perfection. Na-
tional justice systems are not without problems, and likewise,
"an imperfect international court trying, punishing and deter-
ring grievous crimes is infinitely better than nothing."' Recog-
nition of problems facing the international tribunal should
improve the quality of its preparation, thus not deterring the
international community from taking decisive steps. The crea-
tion of the tribunal, although overdue, shows the international
community's commitment to face difficulties. It must continue
in that direction. There should be no excuses, such as interfer-
ence in the domestic affairs of sovereign states or difficulties of
enforcement.' 9 The sovereignty exception is unacceptable, as it
was in Nuremberg. Mr. Justice Jackson's words require repeti-
tion: "If those who have the power of decision revert to the con-
cept of unlimited and irresponsible sovereignty, neither this nor
17 Report, supra note 9 Para. 28, at 8.
18 Eric L. Chase, Stop Swaggering and Start Working for Justice, 133 N.J.L.J.
17, 24 (Jan. 4, 1993).
19 See Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, 35 CRim. L.Q. 129, 131 (Feb. 1993)
(editorial).
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any charter will save the world from international lawless-
ness."2o Hopefully, the substance of these words found their re-
flection in the proposed statute.21
International documents are too weak in wording; the same
goes for statements of officials. For example, there is ample evi-
dence that "ethnic cleansing" is genocide as defined by the Ge-
nocide Convention. 2 However, officials of some states speak of
acts tantamount to genocide. As long as there is hesitancy to be
precise and determinative, there will not be a real tribunal with
proper jurisdiction. Coming back the Judge ad hoc Lauter-
pacht's separate opinion:
[t]he evidence also indicates plainly that, in particular, the forced
migration of civilians, more commonly known as 'ethnic cleans-
ing,' is, in truth, part of a deliberate campaign by the Serbs to
eliminate Muslim control of, and presence in, substantial parts of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Such being the case, it is difficult to regard
the Serbian acts as other than acts of genocide in that they clearly
fall within categories (a), (b) and (c) of the definition of genocide. 23
Even Serbia, speaking in another context, characterized "ethnic
cleansing" or comparable conduct as genocide. 24 Serbia and
Montenegro do not deny that atrocities have occurred of the
character and scale described in various instances, particularly
as noted in the Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia/Mon-
tenegro) case. Not only were these acts proscribed in various
international conventions, but also in the internal Yugoslav fed-
eral criminal code, as well as the Republic's criminal codes. Be-
cause this is not an internal conflict, but rather an international
one,25 there is a need for an international tribunal to find those
20 See Robert Donihi, War Crimes, 66 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 733,735 (1992); John
Norton Moore, War Crimes and the Rule of Law in the Gulf Crisis, 31 VA. J. IN 'L
L. 403 (1991).
21 "The official position of any accused person whether as Head of State of
Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person
of criminal liability nor mitigate punishment." Report, supra note 9, at Article 7,
para. 2.
22 See also, Report, supra note 9, Article 4, at 12 (a definition of genocide in
Article 4 of the proposed statute of the International War Crimes Tribunal).
23 Lauterpacht, supra note 13, at Point 69.
24 Id., at Point 70.
25 'Tere has been a broad consensus outside Yugoslavia to consider the con-
flicts there as international." Meron, Rape as a Crime under International Hu-
manitarian Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 424, 424 n.3 (1993).
1994]
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who committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, col-
lect the evidence, and pass judgments.
In closing, both the international community and victims of
the present aggression need the tribunal. It is perhaps late, but
it is never too late.
In addition, the tribunal should step over its ad hoc charac-
ter and become a permanent international legal institution. In
that capacity, it will stand as a warning for future dictators and
war criminals, and as a pillar of the international legal order.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol6/iss1/7
